Robinson Cole LLP
High Contrast Mode

Scott T. Garosshen focuses their practice on complex and appellate legal needs at the federal and state level. They handle all aspects of appellate litigation, from pre-appeal consults and motion practice with trial counsel, to crafting appellate strategy, to briefing and oral argument on appeal. Above all, Scott works as a translator, offering jurists a clean, focused message that cuts through the noise to the heart of the matter. 

Appellate

Scott has represented clients through more than a hundred appeals, spanning the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as the Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, and Virgin Islands appellate and supreme courts, including nine arguments before the Connecticut Supreme Court.

Scott frequently is called in to litigate issues of first impression for a jurisdiction. Their appellate successes bridge practice areas and include:

  • Securing enforcement of an ART facility contract in a dispute over frozen embryos*
  • Affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal in a bellwether appeal for dozens of cases where medical providers had sued a managed care company over alleged oral contracts.
  • Defeating a party’s use of the double-dip doctrine to shield business interests in a multimillion-dollar asset division*
  • Reversing confirmation of an arbitration award by prevailing on a novel, dispositive choice-of-law question*
  • Dismissing an appeal over arbitrability by successfully terminating the appellate stay then commencing arbitration, mooting the appeal
  • Winning a multimillion-dollar coverage dispute with major implications for the industry
  • Crafting the test the Connecticut Supreme Court adopted from our amicus brief for issues of statutory notice, affecting nearly a hundred statutes for valid governmental notice
  • Disposing of appellate challenges to land use approvals for commercial developers
  • Reversing confirmation of an arbitration award in part in a high-net-worth marital dissolution*
  • Obtaining a new trial on all financial orders in an eight-figure marital dissolution appeal
  • Extending the final judgment test for appealability to allow appeals from denial of a motion to dismiss under a state’s anti-SLAPP statute, in a hotly contested 4-3 decision after two rounds of oral argument, controlling the outcome in multiple pending cases

Scott works closely with client, trial counsel, and subject matter specialists to translate industry realities into terms that resonate with appellate generalist judges. They pay careful attention to litigation narrative and optics, paring down to the key arguments, thinking creatively, and putting in the time to get issue framing right. Often, a well-framed issue decides the appeal.

Litigation

Scott also brings their advocacy and fierce attention to detail to bear on the litigation they conduct at the trial court level.  Scott directs all aspects of motion practice, depositions, witness examinations, and settlement negotiation.  Past successes include:

  • Co-leading commercial arbitration team to seven-figure victory with attorney fees, and denial in full of opposing party’s counterclaim
  • Resolving litigation against charitable organization for roughly 10% of initial demand after deposing critical actors*
  • Negotiating favorable settlement in copyright litigation involving key issue then-pending before U.S. Supreme Court
  • Prevailing at agency hearings on behalf of clients accused of professional responsibility violations*
  • Removing only viable counts in catastrophic injury case via preliminary motion practice then securing withdrawal without payment of remaining counts*

Other Experience

Before joining Robinson+Cole, Scott worked for six years at a prominent appellate boutique firm. Scott’s insight and strategy are informed by their time clerking for the Honorable F. Herbert Gruendel of the Connecticut Appellate Court, whose kindness and mentorship will never be forgotten, as well as formative law school internships with the Honorable Alvin K. Hellerstein of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and the Honorable Vanessa L. Bryant of the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut.

Scott routinely presents seminars on appellate procedure, advocacy, and ethics at bar associations, judicial conferences, universities, and others. They also have been actively involved in teaching the next generation of lawyers, leading and judging moot court and debate programs for aspiring advocates. Doing so sharpens one’s skills and keeps one honest.

*Attorney Garosshen was counsel in these representative transactions prior to joining Robinson+Cole.

  • University of Connecticut School of Law (Juris Doctor, cum laude)
    • CALI Excellence Awards for Moot Court, Constitutional Law, Principles of Insurance, and Federal Courts
  • Georgetown University (Bachelors, cum laude)
    • B.A., Classical Languages and Government

  • State of Connecticut
  • U.S. Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit
  • U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit
  • U.S. Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit
  • U.S. District Court, District of Connecticut

Recognized as a Rising Star as part of Law.com's 2025 New England Legal Awards

Robinson+Cole Diversity, Equity, Inclusion + Belonging Award, 2024

Selected by their peers for inclusion in Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch in the area of Appellate Practice since 2021

Selected as a Rising Star to the Connecticut Super Lawyers list from 2020 to 2025

Connecticut Bar Association
Appellate Advocacy Section, Co-chair (2024 - 2025)
Appellate Advocacy Section, Treasurer (2023 - 2024)
Appellate Advocacy Section, Secretary (2023 - 2024)
Appellate Advocacy Section, Executive Committee (2022 - 2023)
Appellate Advocacy Section, Connecticut Appellate Diversity Subcommittee (2021 - 2022)
Litigation Section, Chair (2023 - 2025)
Litigation Section, Vice Chair (2021 - 2023)
Litigation Section, Secretary (2019 - 2021)
Civics Education Committee, Co-Director (2021 - 2022)
Young Lawyers Section, Co-Director of Civics Education (2020 - 2022)
Pandemic Recovery & Future Court Technology Task Force (2022 - 2023)
Member, LGBT Section

Connecticut Supreme Court Historical Society
Board of Directors

Civics First
Past Vice President
Past Chair, Debate Committee

News


May 28, 2026

John Mutchler + Scott Garosshen Presented with Esteemed Diversity Awards

Intellectual Property + Technology group partner John Mutchler and Appellate group lawyer Scott Garosshen were presented with the Lawyers Collaborative for Diversity’s (LCD) highest honors at the organization’s annual “Edwin Archer Randolph Diversity Award Celebration” on May 26, 2026. John was awarded the 2026 Edwin Archer Randolph Award, which honors the legacy of Edwin Archer Randolph, the first lawyer of color admitted to the Connecticut Bar in 1880. The honor is in recognition of his sustained and deeply personal commitment to advancing diversity, equity, and inclusion within the legal profession. Through leadership roles with the Lawyers Collaborative for Diversity (LCD) and the South Asian Bar Association of Connecticut (SABAC), as well as national service with the South Asian Bar Association of North America (SABA NA), John has paired strategic governance with hands‑on mentorship that has directly shaped the careers of law students and attorneys of color. His consistent advocacy, financial and institutional support of affinity bar organizations, and willingness to use his influence to ensure diverse voices are not only present but empowered have resulted in measurable recruitment, retention, and advancement outcomes across Connecticut’s legal community. John has been a member of LCD since 2018 and served on its Board of Directors from 2021-2023, and as Treasurer from 2024-2026 and is LCD’s President-elect. He has also been a SABAC member since 2017 and has been a member of its Board of Directors since 2021 and has served as Treasurer since 2022. Lastly, John is also a Trustee of the SABA NA Foundation. Scott was recognized as the 2026 Carolyn Golden Hebsgaard Award recipient, which honors Carolyn Golden Hebsgaard, the founding executive director of LCD, who spearheaded initiatives designed to identify, recruit, advance, and retain young attorneys of color in the Connecticut legal profession. Scott’s recognition marks them as an individual who embodies the spirit of the award due to the early distinction they have attained within their first 10 years of legal practice and a demonstrated commitment to developing diverse young lawyers and law students in Connecticut’s legal community. They have sought to leverage their leadership roles in the Connecticut Bar Association (CBA) to nurture the professional growth of underrepresented attorneys and build spaces welcoming to new members from diverse backgrounds. Their leadership and service have been recognized through honors including selection as a Rising Star at the 2025 New England Legal Awards. They have been a member of the CBA since 2019, serving in leadership positions including Co-Chair of the Appellate Advocacy Section, Chair of the Litigation Section, Co-Director of Civics Education for the Young Lawyers Section, and Co-Director of the Civics Education Committee. They are also a former Vice President and Committee Chair of Civics First, and currently serve on the Connecticut Supreme Court Historical Society Board of Directors.

Lawyers Collaborative for Diversity
John Mutchler + Scott Garosshen Presented with Esteemed Diversity Awards teaser
December 11, 2025

Scott Garosshen Authors Article on Policy Interpretation for Preexisting Conditions

Law360 Expert Analysis
December 4, 2025

Health Care Enforcement Team Secures First Circuit Win for Clinical Lab in False Claims Act Appeal

May 28, 2026

John Mutchler + Scott Garosshen Presented with Esteemed Diversity Awards

Intellectual Property + Technology group partner John Mutchler and Appellate group lawyer Scott Garosshen were presented with the Lawyers Collaborative for Diversity’s (LCD) highest honors at the organization’s annual “Edwin Archer Randolph Diversity Award Celebration” on May 26, 2026. John was awarded the 2026 Edwin Archer Randolph Award, which honors the legacy of Edwin Archer Randolph, the first lawyer of color admitted to the Connecticut Bar in 1880. The honor is in recognition of his sustained and deeply personal commitment to advancing diversity, equity, and inclusion within the legal profession. Through leadership roles with the Lawyers Collaborative for Diversity (LCD) and the South Asian Bar Association of Connecticut (SABAC), as well as national service with the South Asian Bar Association of North America (SABA NA), John has paired strategic governance with hands‑on mentorship that has directly shaped the careers of law students and attorneys of color. His consistent advocacy, financial and institutional support of affinity bar organizations, and willingness to use his influence to ensure diverse voices are not only present but empowered have resulted in measurable recruitment, retention, and advancement outcomes across Connecticut’s legal community. John has been a member of LCD since 2018 and served on its Board of Directors from 2021-2023, and as Treasurer from 2024-2026 and is LCD’s President-elect. He has also been a SABAC member since 2017 and has been a member of its Board of Directors since 2021 and has served as Treasurer since 2022. Lastly, John is also a Trustee of the SABA NA Foundation. Scott was recognized as the 2026 Carolyn Golden Hebsgaard Award recipient, which honors Carolyn Golden Hebsgaard, the founding executive director of LCD, who spearheaded initiatives designed to identify, recruit, advance, and retain young attorneys of color in the Connecticut legal profession. Scott’s recognition marks them as an individual who embodies the spirit of the award due to the early distinction they have attained within their first 10 years of legal practice and a demonstrated commitment to developing diverse young lawyers and law students in Connecticut’s legal community. They have sought to leverage their leadership roles in the Connecticut Bar Association (CBA) to nurture the professional growth of underrepresented attorneys and build spaces welcoming to new members from diverse backgrounds. Their leadership and service have been recognized through honors including selection as a Rising Star at the 2025 New England Legal Awards. They have been a member of the CBA since 2019, serving in leadership positions including Co-Chair of the Appellate Advocacy Section, Chair of the Litigation Section, Co-Director of Civics Education for the Young Lawyers Section, and Co-Director of the Civics Education Committee. They are also a former Vice President and Committee Chair of Civics First, and currently serve on the Connecticut Supreme Court Historical Society Board of Directors.

Lawyers Collaborative for Diversity
John Mutchler + Scott Garosshen Presented with Esteemed Diversity Awards teaser
December 11, 2025

Scott Garosshen Authors Article on Policy Interpretation for Preexisting Conditions

Law360 Expert Analysis
December 4, 2025

Health Care Enforcement Team Secures First Circuit Win for Clinical Lab in False Claims Act Appeal

November 6, 2025

Robinson+Cole Commends 62 Attorneys Recognized in 2025 Super Lawyers®

Recognition spans key regions and highlights the firm’s seasoned practitioners and emerging leaders in many business transactions and litigation practices
Robinson+Cole Commends 62 Attorneys Recognized in 2025 <i>Super Lawyers</i>® teaser
October 28, 2025

Robinson+Cole Lawyers Win 2025 New England Legal Awards

Law.com / Connecticut Law Tribune
Robinson+Cole Lawyers Win 2025 New England Legal Awards teaser
September 3, 2025

Robinson+Cole Insurance Practice Launches Latest Blog, Covering Appeals

New resource expands firm’s industry insights, unpacking the latest, high-impact insurance coverage appellate cases and trends
Robinson+Cole Insurance Practice Launches Latest Blog, <i>Covering Appeals</i> teaser
August 26, 2025

78 Robinson+Cole Lawyers Listed in The Best Lawyers in America© 2026

Firm receives top listing in Connecticut lawyer count in national peer review survey
78 Robinson+Cole Lawyers Listed in The Best Lawyers in America© 2026 teaser
June 3, 2025

Scott Garosshen Elected to the CT Supreme Court Historical Society’s Board of Directors

May 12, 2025

Scott Garosshen Named to CCADV’s First 100 Plus Class of 2025

Connecticut Coalition Against Domestic Violence

November 6, 2025

Robinson+Cole Commends 62 Attorneys Recognized in 2025 Super Lawyers®

Recognition spans key regions and highlights the firm’s seasoned practitioners and emerging leaders in many business transactions and litigation practices
Robinson+Cole Commends 62 Attorneys Recognized in 2025 <i>Super Lawyers</i>® teaser
October 28, 2025

Robinson+Cole Lawyers Win 2025 New England Legal Awards

Law.com / Connecticut Law Tribune
Robinson+Cole Lawyers Win 2025 New England Legal Awards teaser
September 3, 2025

Robinson+Cole Insurance Practice Launches Latest Blog, Covering Appeals

New resource expands firm’s industry insights, unpacking the latest, high-impact insurance coverage appellate cases and trends
Robinson+Cole Insurance Practice Launches Latest Blog, <i>Covering Appeals</i> teaser
August 26, 2025

78 Robinson+Cole Lawyers Listed in The Best Lawyers in America© 2026

Firm receives top listing in Connecticut lawyer count in national peer review survey
78 Robinson+Cole Lawyers Listed in The Best Lawyers in America© 2026 teaser
June 3, 2025

Scott Garosshen Elected to the CT Supreme Court Historical Society’s Board of Directors

May 12, 2025

Scott Garosshen Named to CCADV’s First 100 Plus Class of 2025

Connecticut Coalition Against Domestic Violence

Publications


December 4, 2025

11th Circ.’s 6-Step Review May Be Ripe for Insurer Challenge

Law360 Expert Analysis

By a 2-1 vote in Johnson v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that a policy interpretation endorsed by the dissenting opinion, suggested by a prior Eleventh Circuit panel, and adopted by other courts around the country was not just wrong, but so unreasonable that it failed arbitrary-and-capricious review. The Nov. 21 decision is a cautionary tale in several respects.[1] The dispute arose under a long-term disability, or LTD, policy that excluded coverage for preexisting conditions, defined as "any Sickness or Injury for which the Insured received medical Treatment, consultation, care or services, including diagnostic procedures, or took prescribed drugs or medicines." For two years prepolicy, the plaintiff had symptoms of a rare autoimmune disease, scleroderma. She received treatment, took medicines, and underwent diagnostic procedures. But none of her doctors could figure out what it was, diagnosing her with nearly a dozen other ailments instead. After the policy kicked in, her doctors landed on the correct diagnosis. The question for the court was whether something counts as a preexisting condition if the insured was treated for it prepolicy, but her doctors didn't name it correctly. The Result The majority answered no, holding that the insurer thus wrongly denied coverage. This outcome was unlikely for two main reasons. First, this was an LTD policy under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act that granted the insurer "discretionary authority" to interpret it. The insurer could lose only if its interpretation was not just wrong, but so unreasonable as to be "arbitrary and capricious." Second, multiple judges already had interpreted similar policy language in line with the insurer's interpretation. The deferential standard of review may have been diluted in part due to a quirk of the Eleventh Circuit. In contrast to other circuits that apply regular abuse-of-discretion review to an insurer's discretionary interpretation of its own ERISA policy, the Eleventh Circuit uses a bespoke six-step sequence that starts by asking whether the insurer's interpretation is wrong under de novo review, then only later asks if it is so wrong as to be arbitrary and capricious. This sequence triggers what influence scholar and renowned psychologist Robert Cialdini calls "commitment-and-consistency bias": Someone is more likely to agree with a stance if they first agree with it a little. Here, once a judge convinces themself that an interpretation is wrong, there is a stronger cognitive temptation to believe it is also very wrong. By contrast, leading with the abuse-of-discretion question creates a more level playing field. Second, at the policy interpretation stage, things got metaphysical. The majority viewed the Scott Garosshen prepolicy doctors' activities as treating symptoms rather than a medical condition. Because they repeatedly misdiagnosed the plaintiff with other ailments instead of scleroderma, the majority reasoned, they could not have been treating her "for" scleroderma. The "symptoms are not the disease" and "an indication of something is not the thing itself," just as "a wet umbrella is [not] 'the same thing' as a hurricane." The dissent saw it differently. The plaintiff had been treated, prescribed medication, and undergone diagnostics "for the 'various symptoms and conditions of scleroderma.'" There was "more than mere 'consistency' between what [she] was treated for and scleroderma; they are the same thing." Borrowing an umbrella of its own, the dissent reasoned that if one "us[es] an umbrella to stay dry without knowing whether the current rainstorm is a hurricane or quick summer shower," either way, "the umbrella fends off the rains." Since both majority and dissent found different dictionaries and prior cases siding with their respective interpretations, one would expect the insurer to prevail under arbitrary-andcapricious review. Instead, the majority seized on a stray answer at oral argument, construing it as an admission that the insurer would deny coverage if any prepolicy symptom was not inconsistent with the later diagnosis. The majority held that that position, albeit taken from another party in a different case, "is unreasonable — full stop." So, it reversed the judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Looking Ahead This appeal seems ripe for rehearing en banc; although, this is quite rare, especially in insurance coverage cases. As to standard of review, even the majority acknowledged that the Eleventh Circuit's six-step sequence "is likely unnecessarily complex (and may even obscure the lawful result in certain cases)" — the result here is a prime example. If not now, then when the right case comes along, insurers may consider investing in overturning this framework and the subtle cognitive bias it creates. Doing so will aid not just litigants, but also the court. That six-step structure does not only obscure the correct result; it is also unwieldy to apply. The majority nodded to this when it suggested in passing that the contra proferentem rule, requiring a court to defer to the policyholder's reasonable interpretation of ambiguous language, might bolster its conclusion at interpretive step one — i.e., whether, under de novo review, the insurer's interpretation was wrong. Critically, that rule goes out the window at step three — during abuse-of-discretion review, a court must defer to the insurer's reasonable interpretation of ambiguous language. So, the court winds up disregarding its earlier work. Other circuits hold overwhelmingly that contra proferentem simply plays no role in abuseof-discretion review.[2] Only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in its 2019 decision in Dialysis Newco Inc. v. Community Health Systems Group Health Plan, has come out differently in the limited context of interpreting anti-assignment clauses, while acknowledging that this outlier holding created "some tension in [its] caselaw" and may be due for correction.[3] It is thus no wonder that the Eleventh Circuit majority here, after invoking contra proferentem, disavowed any reliance on it, even in step one. That awkward dance (and the makework it entails) could be avoided if the Eleventh Circuit jettisons the six-step framework and joins the rest of the country in assessing simply whether the insurer has discretion, and, if so, whether its interpretation passes abuse-of-discretion review. Turning to the Eleventh Circuit majority's merits policy interpretation, how lower courts apply that test will be key. The test seems to be that the right disease need not be formally diagnosed prepolicy so long as it at least is "suspected." The majority suggests that "strong indications" of the particular illness, "reasonable cause" to diagnose the particular illness, or "a distinct symptom or condition from which one learned in medicine can diagnose the disease" all trigger the preexisting conditions exclusion but were not satisfied on the facts here. Whether that blurry line will yield consistent results in practice remains to be seen. Key Takeaways for Insurers 1. Look out for interpretive frameworks that create commitment-and-consistency bias. Experiments have shown that judges are susceptible to this type of cognitive effect. Although hard to prove in any given case, the long-term effect can be significant. Investing in reshaping the law into a more level playing field affects not just the individual cases but also their broader ripples into adjacent case law. 2. Pay special attention to outlier circuits. When a circuit decision flags one of its own rules as out-of-step with the modern trend, it may be vulnerable to reconsideration en banc, without the need for a trip all the way to One First Street, Washington, D.C. This is especially true when experience has shown the rule to be unworkable. 3. Issue framing and careful answers at oral argument matter. Insurers are often held to a higher standard, even when the law requires more lenient treatment. The effect of this can be mitigated by having a firm theory of the case and knowing exactly when one can, cannot, or must cede ground. [1] Johnson v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, No. 23-13443, 2025 WL 3251015 (11th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025). [2] Dialysis Newco Inc. v. Cmty. Health Sys. Grp. Health Plan, 938 F.3d 246, 251 n.4 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting decisions from the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits). [3] Dialysis Newco, 938 F.3d at 251.

2017

The Development of the Right to Remain Silent

Journal of the Connecticut Supreme Court Historical Society, Volume IX (Connecticut Supreme Court Historical Society copyright, 2017)

Read the article here.

December 4, 2025

11th Circ.’s 6-Step Review May Be Ripe for Insurer Challenge

Law360 Expert Analysis

By a 2-1 vote in Johnson v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that a policy interpretation endorsed by the dissenting opinion, suggested by a prior Eleventh Circuit panel, and adopted by other courts around the country was not just wrong, but so unreasonable that it failed arbitrary-and-capricious review. The Nov. 21 decision is a cautionary tale in several respects.[1] The dispute arose under a long-term disability, or LTD, policy that excluded coverage for preexisting conditions, defined as "any Sickness or Injury for which the Insured received medical Treatment, consultation, care or services, including diagnostic procedures, or took prescribed drugs or medicines." For two years prepolicy, the plaintiff had symptoms of a rare autoimmune disease, scleroderma. She received treatment, took medicines, and underwent diagnostic procedures. But none of her doctors could figure out what it was, diagnosing her with nearly a dozen other ailments instead. After the policy kicked in, her doctors landed on the correct diagnosis. The question for the court was whether something counts as a preexisting condition if the insured was treated for it prepolicy, but her doctors didn't name it correctly. The Result The majority answered no, holding that the insurer thus wrongly denied coverage. This outcome was unlikely for two main reasons. First, this was an LTD policy under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act that granted the insurer "discretionary authority" to interpret it. The insurer could lose only if its interpretation was not just wrong, but so unreasonable as to be "arbitrary and capricious." Second, multiple judges already had interpreted similar policy language in line with the insurer's interpretation. The deferential standard of review may have been diluted in part due to a quirk of the Eleventh Circuit. In contrast to other circuits that apply regular abuse-of-discretion review to an insurer's discretionary interpretation of its own ERISA policy, the Eleventh Circuit uses a bespoke six-step sequence that starts by asking whether the insurer's interpretation is wrong under de novo review, then only later asks if it is so wrong as to be arbitrary and capricious. This sequence triggers what influence scholar and renowned psychologist Robert Cialdini calls "commitment-and-consistency bias": Someone is more likely to agree with a stance if they first agree with it a little. Here, once a judge convinces themself that an interpretation is wrong, there is a stronger cognitive temptation to believe it is also very wrong. By contrast, leading with the abuse-of-discretion question creates a more level playing field. Second, at the policy interpretation stage, things got metaphysical. The majority viewed the Scott Garosshen prepolicy doctors' activities as treating symptoms rather than a medical condition. Because they repeatedly misdiagnosed the plaintiff with other ailments instead of scleroderma, the majority reasoned, they could not have been treating her "for" scleroderma. The "symptoms are not the disease" and "an indication of something is not the thing itself," just as "a wet umbrella is [not] 'the same thing' as a hurricane." The dissent saw it differently. The plaintiff had been treated, prescribed medication, and undergone diagnostics "for the 'various symptoms and conditions of scleroderma.'" There was "more than mere 'consistency' between what [she] was treated for and scleroderma; they are the same thing." Borrowing an umbrella of its own, the dissent reasoned that if one "us[es] an umbrella to stay dry without knowing whether the current rainstorm is a hurricane or quick summer shower," either way, "the umbrella fends off the rains." Since both majority and dissent found different dictionaries and prior cases siding with their respective interpretations, one would expect the insurer to prevail under arbitrary-andcapricious review. Instead, the majority seized on a stray answer at oral argument, construing it as an admission that the insurer would deny coverage if any prepolicy symptom was not inconsistent with the later diagnosis. The majority held that that position, albeit taken from another party in a different case, "is unreasonable — full stop." So, it reversed the judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Looking Ahead This appeal seems ripe for rehearing en banc; although, this is quite rare, especially in insurance coverage cases. As to standard of review, even the majority acknowledged that the Eleventh Circuit's six-step sequence "is likely unnecessarily complex (and may even obscure the lawful result in certain cases)" — the result here is a prime example. If not now, then when the right case comes along, insurers may consider investing in overturning this framework and the subtle cognitive bias it creates. Doing so will aid not just litigants, but also the court. That six-step structure does not only obscure the correct result; it is also unwieldy to apply. The majority nodded to this when it suggested in passing that the contra proferentem rule, requiring a court to defer to the policyholder's reasonable interpretation of ambiguous language, might bolster its conclusion at interpretive step one — i.e., whether, under de novo review, the insurer's interpretation was wrong. Critically, that rule goes out the window at step three — during abuse-of-discretion review, a court must defer to the insurer's reasonable interpretation of ambiguous language. So, the court winds up disregarding its earlier work. Other circuits hold overwhelmingly that contra proferentem simply plays no role in abuseof-discretion review.[2] Only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in its 2019 decision in Dialysis Newco Inc. v. Community Health Systems Group Health Plan, has come out differently in the limited context of interpreting anti-assignment clauses, while acknowledging that this outlier holding created "some tension in [its] caselaw" and may be due for correction.[3] It is thus no wonder that the Eleventh Circuit majority here, after invoking contra proferentem, disavowed any reliance on it, even in step one. That awkward dance (and the makework it entails) could be avoided if the Eleventh Circuit jettisons the six-step framework and joins the rest of the country in assessing simply whether the insurer has discretion, and, if so, whether its interpretation passes abuse-of-discretion review. Turning to the Eleventh Circuit majority's merits policy interpretation, how lower courts apply that test will be key. The test seems to be that the right disease need not be formally diagnosed prepolicy so long as it at least is "suspected." The majority suggests that "strong indications" of the particular illness, "reasonable cause" to diagnose the particular illness, or "a distinct symptom or condition from which one learned in medicine can diagnose the disease" all trigger the preexisting conditions exclusion but were not satisfied on the facts here. Whether that blurry line will yield consistent results in practice remains to be seen. Key Takeaways for Insurers 1. Look out for interpretive frameworks that create commitment-and-consistency bias. Experiments have shown that judges are susceptible to this type of cognitive effect. Although hard to prove in any given case, the long-term effect can be significant. Investing in reshaping the law into a more level playing field affects not just the individual cases but also their broader ripples into adjacent case law. 2. Pay special attention to outlier circuits. When a circuit decision flags one of its own rules as out-of-step with the modern trend, it may be vulnerable to reconsideration en banc, without the need for a trip all the way to One First Street, Washington, D.C. This is especially true when experience has shown the rule to be unworkable. 3. Issue framing and careful answers at oral argument matter. Insurers are often held to a higher standard, even when the law requires more lenient treatment. The effect of this can be mitigated by having a firm theory of the case and knowing exactly when one can, cannot, or must cede ground. [1] Johnson v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, No. 23-13443, 2025 WL 3251015 (11th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025). [2] Dialysis Newco Inc. v. Cmty. Health Sys. Grp. Health Plan, 938 F.3d 246, 251 n.4 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting decisions from the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits). [3] Dialysis Newco, 938 F.3d at 251.

2017

The Development of the Right to Remain Silent

Journal of the Connecticut Supreme Court Historical Society, Volume IX (Connecticut Supreme Court Historical Society copyright, 2017)

Read the article here.


Events


Past

Appellate 101

Mar 11 2026
Presented by the Appellate Advocacy Section - Part of the Solo/Small Firm CLE Series
Past

Appealing Outcomes: Strategies for Success in Bankruptcy Appeals

Oct 9 2025
CBA 2025 Connecticut Bankruptcy Conference
Past

Appellate 101

Mar 11 2026
Presented by the Appellate Advocacy Section - Part of the Solo/Small Firm CLE Series
Past

Appealing Outcomes: Strategies for Success in Bankruptcy Appeals

Oct 9 2025
CBA 2025 Connecticut Bankruptcy Conference
Past

Leadership Recruitment + DEI

Sep 25 2025
CBA Leadership Retreat
Past

14th Annual First 100 Plus Breakfast & Awards Ceremony

May 9 2025
Hartford Marriott Downtown
Past

Appellate Advocacy Institute

November 21-22, 2024
Appellate Advocacy Section of the Connecticut Bar Association
Past

A Discussion with the Honorable Dawne G. Westbrook

Oct 2 2024
Appellate Advocacy Section Meeting of the Connecticut Bar Association
Past

Leadership Recruitment + DEI

Sep 25 2025
CBA Leadership Retreat
Past

14th Annual First 100 Plus Breakfast & Awards Ceremony

May 9 2025
Hartford Marriott Downtown
Past

Appellate Advocacy Institute

November 21-22, 2024
Appellate Advocacy Section of the Connecticut Bar Association
Past

A Discussion with the Honorable Dawne G. Westbrook

Oct 2 2024
Appellate Advocacy Section Meeting of the Connecticut Bar Association

Covering Appeals


Below is an excerpt of the Covering Appeals posts authored by Scott.

Dueling Umbrellas: What to Do When Policy Interpretation Gets Metaphysical

Case Citation: Johnson v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, No. 23-13443, 2025 WL 3251015 (11th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025) The Situation: By a 2-1 vote, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a policy interpretation (1) endorsed by the dissenting opinion, (2) suggested by a prior Eleventh Circuit panel, and (3) adopted by other courts around the country was not just wrong, but so unreasonable that it failed arbitrary-and-capricious review. The case is a cautionary tale in several respects. The dispute arose under a long-term-disability (LTD) policy that excluded coverage for pre-existing conditions, defined as “any Sickness or Injury for which the Insured received medical Treatment, consultation, care or services, including diagnostic procedures, or took prescribed drugs or medicines.” For two years pre-policy, the plaintiff had symptoms of a rare auto-immune disease, scleroderma. She received treatment, took medicines, and underwent diagnostic procedures. But none of her doctors could figure out what it was, diagnosing her with nearly a dozen other ailments instead. After the policy kicked in, her doctors landed on the correct diagnosis. The question for the Court was whether something counts as a preexisting condition if the insured was treated for it pre-policy but her doctors didn’t name it correctly. The Result: The majority answered no, holding that the insurer thus wrongly denied coverage. This outcome was unlikely for two main reasons. First, this was an ERISA LTD policy that granted the insurer “discretionary authority” to interpret it. The insurer could lose only if its interpretation was not just wrong, but so unreasonable as to be “arbitrary and capricious.” Second, multiple judges already had interpreted similar policy language in line with the insurer’s interpretation. Starting with the deferential standard of review, it may have been diluted in part due to a quirk of the Eleventh Circuit. In contrast to other circuits that apply regular abuse-of-discretion review to an insurer’s discretionary interpretation of its own ERISA policy, the Eleventh Circuit uses a bespoke six-step sequence that starts by asking whether the insurer’s interpretation is wrong under de novo review, then only later asks if it is so wrong as to be arbitrary and capricious. This sequence triggers what influence scholar and renowned psychologist Robert Cialdini calls commitment-and-consistency bias: someone is more likely to agree with a stance if they first agree with it a little. Here, once a judge convinces themself that an interpretation is wrong, there is a stronger cognitive temptation to believe it is also very wrong. By contrast, leading with the abuse-of-discretion question creates a more level playing field. Second, at the policy interpretation stage, things got metaphysical. The majority viewed the pre-policy doctors’ activities as treating symptoms rather than a medical condition. Because they repeatedly misdiagnosed the plaintiff with other ailments instead of scleroderma, the majority reasoned, they could not have been treating her “for” scleroderma. The “symptoms are not the disease” and “an indication of something is not the thing itself,” just as “a wet umbrella is [not] ‘the same thing’ as a hurricane.”  The dissent saw it differently. The plaintiff had been treated, prescribed medication, and undergone diagnostics “for the ‘various symptoms and conditions of scleroderma.’” There was “more than mere ‘consistency’ between what [she] was treated for and scleroderma; they are the same thing.” Borrowing an umbrella of its own, the dissent reasoned that if one “us[es] an umbrella to stay dry without knowing whether the current rainstorm is a hurricane or quick summer shower,” either way, “the umbrella fends off the rains.” Since both majority and dissent found different dictionaries and prior cases siding with their respective interpretations, one would expect the insurer to prevail under arbitrary-and-capricious review. Instead, the majority seized on a stray answer at oral argument, construing it as an admission that the insurer would deny coverage if any pre-policy symptom was not inconsistent with the later diagnosis. The majority held that that position, albeit taken from another party in a different case, “is unreasonable—full stop.” So, it reversed the judgment of the district court. Looking Ahead: This appeal seems ripe for rehearing en banc (although quite rare, especially in insurance coverage cases). As to standard of review, even the majority acknowledged that the Eleventh Circuit’s six-step sequence “is likely unnecessarily complex (and may even obscure the lawful result in certain cases)”—the result here is a prime example. If not now, then when the right case comes along, insurers may consider investing in overturning this framework and the subtle cognitive bias it creates. As to the merits policy interpretation, how lower courts apply the majority’s test is key. That test seems to be that the right disease need not be formally diagnosed pre-policy so long as it at least is “suspected.” The majority suggests that “strong indications” of the particular illness, “reasonable cause” to diagnose the particular illness, or “a distinct symptom or condition from which one learned in medicine can diagnose the disease” all qualify but were not satisfied on these facts. Whether that blurry line will yield consistent results in practice remains to be seen. KEY TAKEAWAYS FOR INSURERS Look out for interpretive frameworks that create commitment-and-consistency bias. Experiments have shown that judges are susceptible to this type of cognitive effect. Although hard to prove in any given case, the long-term effect can be significant. Investing in reshaping the law into a more level playing field affects not just the individual cases but also their broader ripples into adjacent caselaw. Issue framing and careful answers at oral argument matter. Insurers often are held to a higher standard, even when the law requires more lenient treatment. The impact of this can be mitigated by having a firm theory of the case and knowing exactly when one can, cannot, or must cede ground.

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Welcome to Robinson+Cole’s “Covering Appeals” Blog

Welcome to Robinson+Cole’s Covering Appeals blog, a new resource that analyzes the latest developments in insurance coverage appeals and provides an in-depth analysis of industry trends. Our Insurance Appeals team is known for handling cutting-edge and precedent-setting insurance appeals nationwide, having been involved in key cases arising from the COVID-19 business interruption insurance litigation, Chinese-manufactured Drywall, labor depreciation, September 11th catastrophe, Hurricane Katrina, and various other issues. Our decades of experience with insurance law and the insurance industry enables us to see the big picture. We are pleased to bring you this new blog, which was inspired by our desire to provide clients and the insurance industry with one dynamic resource covering the insurance appeals space. We hope you will subscribe and enjoy our posts.

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Jurisdictional Quickdraw: How to Avert a State-Court Remand Post-Coinbase

In City of Martinsville, Virginia v. Express Scripts, Inc., 128 F.4th 265 (4th Cir. 2025), two circuits now have forged the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2023 Coinbase v. Bielski decision into a powerful tool that saves savvy defendants from parallel state-court jurisdiction pending their appeal challenging a remand to state court. These circuits read Coinbase to mean that if a defendant quickly appeals a remand order in the short window between (1) an electronic notice of the remand order, and (2) the federal court physically mailing it to the state court, then an automatic appellate stay immediately freezes district court proceedings and stops it from mailing the notice that transfers jurisdiction back to state court, pending appeal. The Result Appealing a remand order in the Fourth or Ninth Circuit is now a jurisdictional quickdraw with the district court clerk. If a defendant notices the appeal before the clerk mails out the remand order to the state court, then an automatic appellate stay triggers. Otherwise, that defendant must seek a permissive stay from the district court that just ruled against them and remanded the case, or from the state court. The Fourth Circuit’s decision creates a 2-3 split. On one hand, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits read Coinbase broadly and extend its automatic-appellate-stay-of-everything rule to remand appeals. On the other hand, the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits narrowly confine Coinbase to arbitration appeals. Typically, remand orders are not appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). So, in addition to a quickdraw, an appellant must also be able to invoke one of the handful of grounds authorizing interlocutory appeal of a remand order. The relevant classics are: class action—discretionary appeal, per 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1); acting under a federal officer—appeal by right, per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1447(d); civil rights case—appeal by right, per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443, 1447(d); declining supplemental jurisdiction—appeal by right, see Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 636 (2009); and prudential remand, not for procedural defect or lack of jurisdiction—appeal by right, see Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 229 (2007). Crucially, if the case was removed in part under (2) or (3), then the entire remand order is reviewable on appeal—including otherwise nonreviewable grounds. See BP P.L.C. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 593 U.S. 230 (2021). Some circuits will look past a pretextual, nonappealable ground when reviewing under (5). See, e.g., LeChase Constr. Services, LLC v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 63 F.4th 160, 162–63 (2d Cir. 2023). As a result, the Coinbase quickdraw and its automatic appellate stay are available in a broader range of cases than one might expect. Looking Ahead  The deepening circuit split and implications for a wide range of federal cases mean this issue will likely return to the U.S. Supreme Court before long. In the meantime, if awaiting a decision on a motion to remand, make sure someone is minding the inbox and that they have quick reflexes. Takeaways for Insurers In cases where an interlocutory appeal of a remand order is available, consider filing fast. In at least two circuits, the reward for beating the district court clerk to the punch is an automatic appellate stay instead of being forced to seek a permissive stay from a court likely disinclined to grant it. Look for opportunities to extend Coinbase into new contexts, such as appraisal. Coinbase reasoned that when the question on appeal is “whether the litigation may go forward in the district court,” then “the entire case is essentially ‘involved in the appeal’” and so automatically stayed. That logic extends not just to remand and arbitrability but also, e.g., to the mandatory appraisal clause in an insurance policy. 

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